Asset Accumulation for the Poor? A View From the Right by Nadler, Richard
Inclusion in Asset Building:  
Research and Policy Symposium  
 
 
 
Asset Accumulation for the Poor? 
A View From the Right 
 
Richard Nadler 
 
2000 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Social Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asset Accumulation for the Poor? 
A View From the Right 
 
 
Richard Nadler 
RIPC 
Overland Park, KS 
(913) 648-6578 
 
 
 
September 2000 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University 
George Warren Brown School of Social Work 
Campus Box 1196 
One Brookings Drive 
St. Louis, Missouri 63130 
Telephone:  (314) 935-7433 
Fax:  (314) 935-8661 
http://gwbweb.wustl.edu/csd 
E-mail:  csd@gwbmail.wustl.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper was commissioned for the Inclusion in Asset Building:  Research and Policy 
Symposium, Center for Social Development, Washington University in St. Louis, September 21-
23, 2000. 
 
The symposium was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the George Warren Brown School of 
Social Work at Washington University.  The organizers and editors were Michael Sherraden and 
Lisa Morris. 
The notion that poor families should own financial assets remains controversial on both the Left and 
the Right.  Many conservatives have become ardent advocates of “the new investor class” — a 
phrase that refers to wage earners who also own capital.  And many have taken that a step farther, 
advocating programs that incentivize matched savings for the working poor. 
 
On the Right, this movement is championed by some pro-capitalist economists.  But it is also 
popular among Christian conservatives, who regard matched savings as a form of re-moralized 
welfare.  The recipient, they reason, shows himself worthy of public aid by his effort to invest in 
himself and his family. Indeed, “assets for the poor” has become mainstream enough to find a niche 
in George W. Bush’s economic plan, which includes Individual Development Accounts. 
 
Why is this?  If conservatives hold that market mechanisms are optimal, or at least adequate, to 
discharge society’s obligation to the poor, then why do so many of them advocate policy changes 
which incentivize savings? 
 
This paper will answer that question three ways.  Conservatives have power-political, ideological, 
and ethical reasons to support asset formation among low-income families. 
 
The Politics of Asset Holding 
 
It is a cliche of American politics that Democrats are the party of wage earners, Republicans the 
party of asset-holders.  But it is a cliche with a basis in fact.  In January, 1999, Rasmussen Research 
conducted a 6,400-person survey which tabulated political party affiliation and asset ownership 
against a broad range of common demographic variables, including gender, age, race, income level, 
and marital status. The survey defined asset holders broadly, to include anyone owning $5,000 or 
more of stocks, bonds and mutual funds.  
 
Politically, owners of portfolios generally favored the G.O.P.  The entire sample was 36.9% 
Democrat and 31.6% Republican. But among non-investors, the Democrat advantage was 40.6%-
27.1%, while among investors, the G.O.P. held a 37.9%-to-32.9% edge. 
 
Less expectedly, portfolio owners trended Republican among core liberal constituencies.  Indeed, 
asset-ownership was associated with increased G.O.P. affiliation among voters who were black, 
single, young, low-income, and female — all significant elements of the Democratic coalition.  
Among low income earners — workers earning $20,000-or-less per year — portfolio ownership 
reduced the Democrat advantage from 46.0%-to-22.1% (among non-asset-holders) to 43.0%-to-
31.6% (among asset-holders).  In other words, the Democrat/Republican gap decreased from 23.9% 
to 11.4%.  And among lower-middle-class earners — workers earning more than $20,000, but less 
than $40,000 — a Democrat majority among non-asset holders (41.7%-29.1% ) became a 
Republican majority among portfolio owners (38.6%-35.6%). 
 
My analysis of the Rasmussen survey circulated widely among Republicans on Capitol Hill. I 
reported party affiliation among 43 separate demographic subgroups based on ownership or non-
ownership of portfolio assets.  The results are appended to this paper -- their first formal publication. 
Supplementary research demonstrated that whatever advantage the G.O.P. might derive from the 
growth of asset-holding would be magnified by the civic-mindedness of worker-capitalists. An 
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April, 2000 study I conducted for the Dean Witter Foundation found that investors were 13.5 percent 
likelier than non-investors to describe themselves as “high propensity voters,” and 15.3 percent 
likelier to describe themselves as “absolutely certain to vote” in the 2000 presidential election.1 
 
The Rasmussen numbers document the affinity of investors for the G.O.P., but do not explain it.  
However, periodic polls of investors conducted by the Nasdaq stock market give significant clues. 
As people change their mix of wealth-seeking activities, they change the sources from which they 
acquire information.  Worker-capitalists actively seek information that will enable them to maximize 
their efficiency in their new vocation, as owners of capital.  These new sources of information 
generally explain political events in terms more capitalist, less social-democrat, than the information 
sources they replace. 
 
In its periodic examination of investor reading habits, the Nasdaq reported that the diverse investor 
class of 1997 was better read than the more economically elite pool of 1985.  In 1997, more 
investors read The Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Money, and Business. Week.  Other financial 
publications widely read in 1997, such as Kiplinger’s Report and Investors Business Daily, didn’t 
exist in 1985.  The big losers in readership were metropolitan dailies, whose share as primary 
sources of investment advice declined from 58 percent in 1985 to 20 percent in 1997.  The print 
generalists lost market share to the financials.  The impact of this shift on workers’ voting patterns is 
impossible to isolate (at least, with existing data).  But clearly, the editorial content of Forbes, the 
Wall Street Journal, and Investors Business Daily differs markedly from that of the Philadelphia 
Inquirer, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times.2 
 
To summarize: One explanation for the Right’s growing enthusiasm for broad-based asset-holding 
was that it correlated positively with conservative political affiliation. 
 
Had the asset market not changed, this might have been irrelevant.  Anatole France observed that in 
the French Third Republic, paupers and millionaires were treated alike when they attempted to sleep 
under viaducts.  He meant, of course, that the amenities available to the one class were unavailable 
to the other, rendering the “equality” absurd.  That asset-holding correlated with a Republican shift 
among lower-income voters would be moot had these workers acquired no assets.  But the 
revolution in defined contribution plans in the 1980s and 1990s resulted in the widest diffusion of 
financial assets in human history. 
 
By October 2000, 78 percent of American voters held stocks, bonds or mutual funds.3  The most 
recent Federal Reserve numbers reported the median income of shareholders at roughly $50,000.  
Their median holding was $25,000.4 
 
Fifty-five million of these new capitalists, owning $2.2 trillion of corporate assets, entered the 
market through work-based defined contribution plans.  One type of defined contribution plan, the 
401(k), enrolled 39 million participants with $1.5 trillion of assets.5 
 
The spread of asset ownership included many workers of humble means.  A Zogby survey conducted 
late in 2000 found that among Americans earning $15,000-or-less annually, 26.1% had an IRA or 
401(k) account; 24.4% held mutual fund shares; 17.0% owned stocks outside of a retirement plan; 
and 15.1% were bondholders.  Obviously these categories overlapped.  But 45.9% of these low-
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income earners held at least one of these financial assets.6 
 
Given the impressive growth of financial asset ownership. and the apparent correlation of this 
growth with G.O.P. affiliation, Republican leaders began to regard policies which incentivize asset 
formation more fondly. In 1999, the Rasmussen numbers circulated widely among Republicans on 
Capitol Hill, and the G.O.P. started pushing less for a flat tax, more for incentivized individual 
investment. The “new” emphasis included: Education Savings Accounts, Medical Savings Accounts, 
Personal Retirement Accounts both inside and outside of Social Security; expanded IRAs; expanded 
401(k)s; “catch-up” provisions for older workers’ retirement accounts; and Individual Development 
Accounts.7 
 
The Ideology of Asset Democratization 
 
But while the tactics of shareholding fascinated politicians of the Right, a different set of variables 
absorbed libertarian economists.  
 
The emerging mass class of wage-earning capitalists represented something novel in history.  The 
idea was not new in the United States.  In 1798, fifty years before Karl Marx penned his Communist 
Manifesto, the American statesman Albert Gallatin launched the first profit-sharing plan at his 
glassworks in New Geneva, Pennsylvania.  “The democratic principle upon which this Nation was 
founded,” he wrote, “should not be restricted to the political processes, but should be applied to the 
industrial operation.” 8 
 
In recommending a supplementation of workers’ wages with profit- or asset-sharing, our future 
Treasury Secretary attacked the problem of “alienation” which would so exercise Karl Marx.  But 
Gallatin’s solution occurred within the propertarian order.  Asset accumulation empowered the 
worker in his own person, through private ownership, rather than through some “revolutionary” 
vanguard which would hold the means of production in his name. 
 
As America entered the 1990s, the apocalyptic tide of revolutionary socialism was receding from its 
century of bloody experiments.   Globally, capitalist models of currency stability and open trade 
were creating (and distributing) wealth on a scale unprecedented in human history.  But the 
electorates of the democratic nations seemed no closer to embracing a capitalist world view. 
Conservative intellectuals, proud of their reorganization of the industrial world in the 1980s, were at 
a loss to explain, let alone combat, the triumphs of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, and the general 
resurgence of Social Democracy on the European continent. 
 
What follows is a synthesis of the theory of worker capitalism as it has developed over the past four 
years, and the strategic concept of investor-side supply-side incrementalism that derived therefrom.  
Many economists, theorists and journalists have contributed to it, most notably Laurence Kudlow, 
John Hood, James Glassman, and Ben Wattenburg.  But the specific form in which I shall present 
worker capitalism and its corollaries is that developed by myself and National Review senior editor 
Ramesh Ponnuru.9 
Historical Backdrop 
 
Although democratic capitalism has compiled an unparalleled track record of success in advancing 
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material well-being for great masses of people, communism, its discredited half-brother, has 
maintained its psychological hold on wage workers wherever they have been enfranchised.  
Capitalist institutions grow only in republics. But even there, they rarely last. Indeed, their 225 
continuous years under the United States Constitution comprise the longest period such institutions 
have been maintained anywhere on earth. 
 
Examples of the ephemerality of successful capitalisms abound.  The overthrow of the merchant 
princes by the guild system in late medieval Belgium; the demise of the Liberal Party in turn-of-the-
Century England; the fall of the Argentine Republic to the Peronistas — in each case, a republican 
system that excelled in creating wealth was overturned by an enfranchised majority, and replaced 
with a system that brought economic catastrophe. 
 
But if Capitalism’s duration is fleeting in Republics, it thrives nowhere else at all.  Republican 
institutions foster commercial law by restricting centralized authority.  Historically, this has allowed 
customary and statutory contracts to evolve.  A fungible currency that doubles as a store of value is 
the sine non qua of capital accumulation. Only the “split” governments of Republics successfully  
limit sovereign depredations — confiscation or debasement — against media of exchange.  
 
Early Republics enfranchise property owners.  Groups that own the means of production, including 
land, labor and transportation, share power.  But over time, non-propertied groups are enfranchised 
as well — sometimes to swell armies, sometimes to bolster a group already empowered. A wage-
earning class may be enfranchised by actions of an empowered class in a Republic to advance a 
market viewpoint (repeal of the Corn Laws), an anti-market viewpoint (the Catiline rebellion), or 
both.  But once enfranchised, nothing in a wage worker’s daily life conveys the “price” of public 
policy in market terms.  The “marketplace of ideas” proves anything but — that is, no price signals 
reach the proletariat on market framework issues. 
 
An enfranchised working class sometimes supports the position of its employers (as, for instance, in 
the McKinley vs. Bryan election of 1896).  But workers may just as easily ally with other 
enfranchised interests, as in the New Deal coalition created by Franklin Roosevelt. Nothing in daily 
life conveys the laws governing capital markets to wage workers, who personalize their efforts to 
acquire wealth as a struggle against employers. 
 
Viewed through the blinders of class warfare, policies that undermine the conditions of employment 
long-term are valued on their short-term impact.   Thus, laws that inflate the currency, restrain trade, 
mandate wages and transfer wealth often prove popular among enfranchised wage workers.  The 
structural problems introduced into the economy — reduced savings, capital flight — are not 
“priced” in the political system by those who have no stake in capital ownership. 
 
This historical conundrum accounts for the psychological persistence of Marxism.  The attempt to 
organize economic life independent of market price signals has been discredited, both in theory and 
in practice.  But the attempt recurs in electoral politics.  Class war undermined democratic 
capitalisms throughout their history.  Thinkers on the Right regarded this structural myopia as a 
permanent information abyss sundering the classes that owned from the classes that earned.  But 
when shareholding exploded at the end of the 1980s, some of us saw the wage-earning investor as 
the bridge across that abyss, to a post-Marxist world. 
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The theory of Worker Capitalism states that as wage-earners expand their wealth-seeking activities 
to include capital ownership, they adopt some of the behaviors and attitudes historically associated 
with the bourgeoisie.  Seen in this context, the political findings in the Rasmussen survey were a 
mere fragment of a broader set of convergences.  The most comprehensive summary of these 
findings to date is my own paper, “The Rise of Worker Capitalism,” published as Policy Analysis 
359 by the Cato Institute (November 1, 1999).  Here is a summary of some of the “bourgeois” 
attitudinal and behavioral shifts associated with shareholding:10 
 
— asset holders are likelier to live married than non-asset holders; 
— asset holders have a higher propensity to vote in elections; 
— asset holders exhibit a higher level of job satisfaction;  
— asset holders are likelier to identify with the interests of employers; 
— asset holders favor public policies which cut taxes on savings and investments; 
— asset holders are skeptical about the solvency of government entitlements, such as Medicare and 
Social Security; and 
— asset holders are likelier to vote Republican. 
 
A corollary to “worker capitalism” involves information acquisition: As wage-earners expand their 
wealth seeking activities to include capital ownership, they actively acquire sources of information 
to maximize their efficiency in their new vocation, i.e., capital ownership. 
 
Extensive data verifies this corollary.  The Investment Company Institute (representing much of the 
mutual fund industry) and the Profit Sharing/ 401(k) Council of America (representing companies 
with matched savings plans) routinely compile data on worker behavior in defined contribution 
plans.  From this data we know: 
 
— that workers’ participation rates in matched savings plans have increased steadily over time at all 
income levels where such plans are available; 
— that workers’ are increasingly involved in evaluating investments pre-purchase, monitoring 
investment performance; and designing personalized investment strategies; and 
— that employers are providing descriptive financial materials of increasing sophistication to their 
retirement-plan employees in response to demand for the same.11 
 
 
Today, eligible working-poor families enter matched savings plans in significant numbers.  When 
401(k) plans were relatively new, in 1983, only 38.3% of all eligible workers participated.  Now that 
rate is near 80%. Among workers earning $10,000-to-$20,000, the participation rate is now 46%.  In 
other words, when the working poor are offered a voluntary matched savings plan, roughly half will 
participate over time.12 
 
A Unique Class 
 
How permanent is the American worker’s “love affair with markets”?  Do worker capitalists 
comprise a new class in history, or do they merely recapitulate a periodic speculative exuberance of 
the American economy? 
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From the days of Albert Gallatin, profit-sharing plans, including payments of company stock, have 
existed in the American workplace. And from the Civil War onward, America had the world’s most 
sophisticated infrastructure for capital diffusion. The North’s military campaigns were financed by 
firms which mass-marketed public debt on low commissions — a daring innovation for its time.  
After the war, the nationwide sales infrastructure created by the bond house barons — Jay Cooke 
and a handful of others — provided the backbone of the American securities industry.  Once 
established, these brokerages could handle the mass marketing of stock issues and private bonds as 
well as government issues.13 
 
The earliest surveys of asset ownership, compiled in the 1930s, found roughly 10 percent of 
Americans holding company stocks and 12 percent holding bonds.14 
 
A small number of influential companies used profit sharing and company stock to sweeten 
employees’ compensation packages.  These early plans emphasized a worker’s unity of interest with 
his employer.  But he chief impediment to the expansion of worker-capitalism was the literal-
mindedness of its exponents.  The employee’s status as “capitalist” was captive to the fortunes of a 
single company — his own!  Thus, many early profit-sharing experiments perished in the stock 
crash of 1892. Later, the market meltdown of 1929 liquidated about 70% of such plans.  
 
This history is unlikely to repeat.  Two technical innovations distinguish the current tide of worker 
capitalism from its predecessors.  Both render worker investments more secure. 
 
The first innovation was the rise of the defined contribution plan as the preferred successor to 
defined benefit (DB) pension plans.  Under DB programs, union representatives negotiated specific 
benefit packages with employers, who then assumed full fiduciary responsibility for funding the 
benefits.   
 
The capitalist crisis of the mid-1970s forced corporate America to obviate a sustained negative 
return on capital.  With entire sectors of corporate America verging on collapse, industrial managers 
saw pension liabilities as an impediment to necessary restructuring.  The replacement of DB 
programs with Defined Contribution (DC)  plans became a top business priority. Under DC plans, 
workers assumed fiduciary responsibility for their own pension accounts.  Typically, an employer 
would match a portion of what the employee set aside for his own retirement.  Both employer and 
employee contributions were tax sheltered, providing the worker an additional incentive to save, and 
the employer an incentive to shift a portion of total compensation toward pensions.  The DC fund 
itself was the individual private property of the employee, subject only to penalties for early 
withdrawal.  And his was the fiduciary responsibility. The ultimate size of his retirement benefits 
depended on the performance of his plan assets during his working years.  
 
The unions assumed this meant that pensions would be underfunded. Corporate leaders, seeking 
relief from one more bankrupting work rule, didn’t care.  But neither the captains of labor nor of 
capital anticipated what happened next.  By incorporating capital ownership into the wage structure 
on a massive scale, these plans created a nation of capitalists, each plotting to maximize his-or-her 
return.  In under two decades, history’s first mass class of shareowning wage earners emerged, as 
DC participation grew to 55 million.  (A benchmark for comparison: In France, where the unions 
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successfully fought them, less than 1 percent of the working population is covered by DC plans.)  
 
The realized rate of return on DC plans soon exceeded that of their DB progenitors.  Moreover, 
workers flooded their personal DC plans with new savings.  From 1983 onward, pension assets grew 
lustily, in aggregate, median and average.15  
 
The second technical innovation — one which preceded the DC revolution, but exploded because of 
it — was the mass marketing of mutual funds.  Mutuals provided workers with a direct, personally 
owned price signal that (unlike individual stocks) encompassed a broad swath of the international 
market.  These funds, indices of capital ownership, rose or fell in value as free market policies 
advanced or receded.  Moreover, the worker’s capital involvement was insulated from the 
vicissitudes of any individual company — including his own. 
 
Under the new regime of mass shareownership, responsibility for the welfare of capitalism was 
universalized within the proletariat.  And for the first time in history, wage earners received genuine 
price signals regarding the welfare of that system.  They received them literally, in the mail.  They 
were called “monthly statements.”  The mutuals funds in DC plans became revolutionary tools of 
worker-investor consciousness. 
 
These technical innovations occurred fortuitously in the midst of the greatest bull market in history.  
The Soviet collapse stimulated trade and currency reform throughout the developing world by  
eliminating “East-versus-West” military alliances as the basis for international transfers of capital.  
To attract private foreign investment, Third World regimes had to stabilize property rights and media 
of exchange.  The resultant reforms expanded markets globally — a development highly 
advantageous to companies that produced goods and services efficiently, and to investors holding 
their shares.  
 
Simultaneously, the technological revolution in computation triggered a sharp increase in worker 
productivity, which boosted inducements to invest.  
 
 
Investor-side Supply-side 
 
The theory of worker capitalism spawned a strategic approach called investor-side supply-side 
incrementalism.  On the Right, the new thinking grew out of an uncomfortable recognition that 
supply-side politics had stagnated in the post-Reagan era.  The same tax cut initiatives that removed 
some 33% of American families from the income tax rolls damaged the political prospects of 
reforming — that is, rationalizing — the tax code through a single low rate broadly applied. 
Supporters of worker capitalism argued that the essential goals of supply-side economics — a tax 
system that is lower and flatter in an economy that is less regulated — could be achieved by popular 
programs that reduce taxes on savings and investment. 
 
Indeed, the argument on the Right between supporters and opponents of asset-formation policy 
centers on this point.16  Supporters of investor-side supply-side contend that most so-called “flat tax” 
proposals, including those of Steve Forbes and Dick Armey, aim primarily at eliminating double 
taxation on investment.  For instance, a tax rate that exempts 33 percent of families before kicking in 
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a rate of 17 percent can be called many things -- but “flat” is not one of them. What it proves is that 
“flat tax” proponents can hire polling consultants as well as their foes. A true flat rate on income 
would be far lower, even if it were revenue-neutral.  But such a rate would raise taxes for the 
millions of families who currently pay no income tax at all. 
 
Proposals like Forbes’ really would flatten the existing rate structure.  But they do it somewhat 
differently than advertised.  The flat-taxers eliminate (or severely curtail) the taxation of investment 
income.  This means that as an individual’s pattern of wealth acquisition shifts proportionally toward 
investments, away from wages, his effective tax rate will decline.  As the breath and depth of worker 
capitalism increase, the progressivity of the code would decline overall — a goal conservatives 
applaud. 
 
Recognizing the essence of the flat-tax strategy, investor-side supply-siders called for an end to the 
single-rate fetishism which sacrificed achievable goals of investment tax relief to unachievable goals 
of flat rates on earned income.  We reasoned that the swelling ranks of investors created an historic 
opportunity to create a tax structure both lower and flatter.  The core of the strategy was to rewrite 
the tax code to exempt much or all investment income from taxation.  Then, as the mix of wealth 
generating activities of American workers shifted inexorably from wages to investment income, the 
structure for lower and flatter effective rates would be in place — in effect, a kind of reverse 
“bracket creep.” 
 
A capital-friendly tax code is a principal goal of all supply-siders.  We reasoned that as taxes are 
reduced on all forms of savings — retirement, health care, education, job training, home ownership 
— the scope of the income tax could be restricted to income retained for ordinary consumption 
expenditures in a yearly cycle. In effect, it would become a tax on “consumed income” — a 
backdoor approach to a pure consumption tax.   
 
Legislative Strategy 
 
Our congressional tactic is to place policies that incentivize self-investment into direct budgetary 
competition with programs that encourage programmatic government spending.  Right wing 
proponents of asset incentives therefore advocate Educational Savings Accounts, Medical Savings 
Accounts, Personal Retirement Accounts (both inside and outside Social Security), and Universal 
IRAs, which fuse several long- and intermediate-term savings goals.  (Individual Development 
Accounts are a form of Universal IRA.)  Our agenda also includes expanded deductions for popular 
savings vehicles, such as IRAs, Roths, stock options, 401(k)s, and other DC plans, as well as 
tradition Republican policies to index capital gains while reducing the rates applied to them.17 
 
Investment-side tax cuts create a terrain subtly advantageous to conservatives.  Advocates of 
government spending programs use two tactics to expand them.  First, they broaden the class of 
persons to whom transfer payments are available. Second, they deepen the recipients’ benefits.  For 
instance, a housing program may initially convey a 20 percent subsidy to developers who service 
areas where the mean income is 70 percent of the official poverty rate.  A year later, program 
advocates may recommend subsidies for areas where the mean income is, say, 85 percent of the 
poverty rate — that is, they attempt to broaden the program constituency by diluting its purpose.  
That done, advocates will attempt to enlarge the subsidy itself, say from 20 to 25 percent — that is, 
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they’ll deepen the benefit.  As the years roll by, you may find a transferrable 50 percent developer 
subsidy “targeting” people earning 200 percent of the poverty level! 
 
By this process, traditional spending programs, whether Headstart or HUD, are reduced to imbecility 
over time, servicing middle-class constituents with steep transfer payments siphoned through a 
bloated vendor bureaucracy.  And in truth, the worse a program becomes, the more unassailable its 
position politically.  It’s constituency has been “widened and deepened” into permanence. 
 
When one considers investor-side supply-side programs, the form is the same, but the substance is 
reversed.  Take education savings programs — Coverdell accounts, as we call them, after the late 
Georgia senator who was their champion.  They’re a work in progress.  The initial bipartisan 
program sheltered investment earnings tax free in an account dedicated to college education.  In 
1999, Republicans attempted to broaden the program’s constituency by including tuition to 
elementary and secondary schools among the educational purposes to which tax sheltered funds 
could be applied. The G.O.P. leadership also deepened the benefit by increasing the annual 
contribution limit from $500 to $2000. In this form, the bill passed Congress handily, with 
considerable Democrat support, before President Clinton vetoed it.   
 
In his campaign, George W. Bush not only revived the Republican plan, but expanded it. He 
proposed to hike the annual contribution limit to $5,000. 
 
Al Gore countered with a different program — the 401(j) account.  But Gore also broadened the 
program’s constituency, expanding permissible tax sheltered uses of the accounts to include job 
training and adult education.  And Gore also deepened the benefit, creating a generous matched 
savings plan financed with tax credits. 
 
An expanded education savings program will soon become law.  Regardless of its partisan 
parentage, it will both cut taxes and voucherize educational choices.  And a broadened constituency 
will be mobilized to preserve its deepened benefits.  Tactically, Coverdell’s idea will advance 
through Congress  like any spending program. Indeed, the green-eye-shades at CBO will score it as a 
“tax expenditure.” 
 
But how different the effect!  To the extent that the purpose of the original ESA has been diluted, 
individuals will enjoy greater freedom over their education spending rather than less.  And to the 
extent that the benefit has been enlarged — broadened and deepened — the amount of untaxed 
earnings will expand, rather than contract.  
 
To summarize: Deepening the benefits of incentivized savings means expanding the tax cuts or 
credits that finance them.  Broadening the base of beneficiaries means increasing the constituency 
for such tax cuts or credits.  And diluting the purpose of such programs means perfecting the 
privately held financial assets they “create” (i.e., refund) as genuine private property, unrestricted by 
programmatic considerations.  What started as a social program evolves into a tax cut.18 
 
Investment incentives thus bear the same relation to the State as a virus to a computer, growing at its 
expense.  Over time, incentivized savings programs will privatize functions of government and the 
taxes that pay for them piecemeal, through the ordinary workings of politics.  The political code is 
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the same — but the effect is the opposite, increasing freedom and limiting government. 
 
Tactical Considerations 
 
Free market economists generally reject social engineering through the tax code.  Conservative 
supporters of incentivized savings are often attacked by our colleagues on this basis.  We respond 
first, that incentivized savings are a form of tax cut, albeit imperfect, and second, that the 
imperfections are reduced over time as the programs expand through the political processes 
described above.19 
 
Incentivized investment policies, even restricted ones, offer a broad scope of personal choice among 
programmatic elements, much like the best voucher programs, and an even broader choice between 
savings and consumption within each particular program.  The perfection of property rights over 
time, achieved by the cynical (and dependable) dilution of political purpose, can deregulate entire 
functions of government, creating genuine markets where they do not currently exist.  
 
But conservatives certainly do not support all laws which incentivize savings. We measure both the 
end -- does the program extend asset holding? -- and the means -- does it compete directly with 
vendor-directed spending?.  
 
In my own journal, K.C. Jones Monthly, I developed the following tripartite test for conservatives 
who wish to expand asset formation while avoiding the shoals of social engineering:  
 
— a) Is the program a tax cut? 
Asset formation must be “incentivized” not by new spending, but by a tax reduction or tax 
credit.  Ideally, any tax credit should not exceed the recipient’s total tax liability at the level of 
government that issues it.  Better still, eligibility should be proportioned to one’s actual tax 
liability.  
— b) Are the financial assets private property? 
The “program”, however restricted as to time and purpose, must be delivered in the form of a 
financial asset that is personally owned and managed by the recipient. 
— c) Does the program leverage tax effort? 
A program which incentivizes an investment account must not be used to leverage “tax effort” 
at the state or local level, but may — indeed, should — be used to leverage additional tax cuts 
or credits at the state or local level. 
 
Tactically, conservative advocates of worker capitalism are more flexible than these criteria might 
suggest.  Many of us, for instance, support the Bush program for Individual Development Accounts 
despite the fact that the tax credit goes first to a vendor.20  Tactical flexibility derives from the 
understanding that the incentivized savings programs that dominate the daily agenda of investor-side 
supply-siders are incidental to our primary goal: the creation of a capitalist electorate.  We 
recognize that asset formation creates long-term habits and interests that operate independently of 
any program. We hope to accelerate the creation-in-progress of a mass class of capital-owning wage 
earners who, once initiated, will actively acquire the means to perfect their understanding of markets 
in their new vocation as capitalists.  And this in turn will stabilize the essential structures of 
democratic capitalism.   
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The goal of creating more asset holders may therefore trump certain tactical considerations listed 
above. The transformation of the electorate into capitalists dictates what compromises we will 
accept.  In public policy as in other fields, a genuine market must exist before individuals become 
rational players in it. 
 
Ethical Concerns 
 
Many on the Right support asset formation policies for moral reasons.  Conservatives criticized 
Great Society programs for encouraging long-term dependency and discouraging initiative.  Policies 
that build habits of long-term planning through self-investment answer these objections.  Moreover, 
matched savings plans, which require positive effort from recipients of aid, are highly popular 
among those Christian conservatives who admire the private welfare associations of the 19th 
Century.21 
These viewpoints too have a venerable history in the American workplace.22  In 1939, with the 
nation on the verge of war, the U.S. Senate invited a group of industrialists to Washington to discuss 
labor relations.  The senators were anxious to minimize work stoppages should the nation be drawn 
into hostilities. 
 
Many of these businessmen had seen their asset-sharing plans collapse during the Great Depression. 
 Nonetheless, those who had run such programs remained enthusiastic about their potential.  In 
deposition after deposition, they maintained that laborers, as stock owners and profit-sharers, would 
develop event horizons longer than a paycheck period. They further believed that through profit-
sharing the material interests of labor and management would be reconciled; that labor unrest and 
political class struggle would decline; and that labor productivity and compensation would rise in 
consequence.  
 
General R.E. Wood, president of Sears, Roebuck & Co. summarized their attitude.  “We believe,” he 
told the Senate Finance Committee, “that a successful profit-sharing plan does increase the 
employees’ responsibility, it helps to avoid labor unrest and strikes, and gives the employee a feeling 
of greater security and unity of interest with the employer. We believe, if adopted generally, that 
profit sharing would lead to a more flexible wage scale. We believe firmly in the joint contribution 
of employees and employer. It creates a feeling of mutual responsibility and trust.” 
 
These captains of industry persuaded Congress to allow them to write off shared profits as a wage 
expense, avoiding double taxation on compensation. The DC plans of today are the lineal 
descendants of their efforts. Such programs are now sufficiently widespread that we can gauge the 
accuracy of the industrialists’ forecasts. 
 
Personal Responsibility 
 
A representative of the Visking Company told the Senate Finance Committee in 1939: “We are 
inclined to believe that as the reserve in any individual employee’s account increases, he looks more 
and more to it as a fund which will help him in his old age.” 
 
Indeed, the availability of matched savings inclined eligible workers to save more.  Research by 
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James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise demonstrates that savings in 401(k) plans 
represents a net increase rather than a substitute for other savings.23  And Andrew Samwick and 
Jonathan Skinner found that employees are less likely to liquidate retirement accounts the longer 
they have participated in such programs.24  The growing availability of defined contribution plans 
has correlated with a general increase in retirement savings.  Contemporary workers start their 
savings roughly nine years earlier than their parents. 
 
Labor Peace 
 
The plan managers who testified in 1939 knew that profit-sharing and stock ownership plans would 
reduce labor strife, a rising concern at the time. “We have not had a strike in 50 years,” said Proctor 
& Gamble Co.’s Richard Deupress. “Our turn-over of labor is almost nothing.” 
 
Added Frank Gannett of Gannett Newspapers: “If most of our corporations would work out such a 
policy, we would have few strikes.” 
 
M. L. Joslyn, President of Joslyn Manufacturing & Supply Co., extolled the role of profit-sharing in 
uniting divergent interests within an organization: “A corporation has three distinct interests—
ownership, management, and labor—and each of those interests is essentially selfish. There is just 
one way to weld them together in a common cause, by devising a plan which secures better results to 
all those interests at the same time... Taking away from one interest and giving to another is never 
going to bring that about. We believe our plan recognizes all those truths. . . That is why it works 
and pays.” 
 
The growth of asset ownership among the working population has tracked, if not caused, a 
remarkable increase of labor peace.  From 1977, the year before 401(k)s were authorized, to 1997, 
the number of work stoppages declined from 298 to 29.  The number of workers idled by strikes 
shrank from 1.2 million to 339,000.  Workdays lost to strikes declined as a percentage of the nations 
labor hours from 0.1% in 1977 to 0.01% in 1997.25 
  
Security and Total Compensation 
 
Several industrialists argued that profit-sharing and asset-distribution, by making labor costs more 
flexible, might help reduce layoffs and bankruptcies.  At the same time, workers might derive higher 
total compensation. H. S. Murray, president of Kalak Water Co., provided a hypothetical case: “John 
Smith receives a pay of $5,000 per year. The company has had a good year, and Smith asks for an 
increase to $7,000. He is entitled to it, but the $7,000 may result in increasing the fixed overhead of 
the company to a point where it would be burdensome during subsequent and less prosperous years. 
When those poor years come, no executive likes to reduce salaries and wages, and usually defers 
doing so until it becomes necessary to take drastic action. Rather do I prefer to see John Smith 
continue to receive an annual stipend of $5,000 with a profit-sharing plan whereby at the end of a 
good year he will not only receive the additional $2,000 which he desires, but perhaps $5,000. . . . 
Then, if off years ensue, the fixed overhead of the company has been maintained at a point where it 
is bearable under adverse conditions.” 
 
Several healthy academic careers have been launched verifying this least-intuitive of the 
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industrialists’ claims.26  James Chelius and Robert S. Smith found that asset-accumulation plans 
minimized turnover in small businesses that had them, particularly during downturns in sales.  
Surveys conducted by Hewitt Associates for the Profit Sharing/ 401(k) council of America found 
that companies lacking asset-accumulation plans had labor turnover rates 66 percent higher than 
those that had them.  And finally, a 1989 Employees Benefit Report by the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce found that overall manufacturing compensation was higher, occupation-by-occupation, in 
firms with asset accumulation plans despite a slight deficit in hourly wages and defined benefits in 
companies offering such plans. 
 
Unity of Interests 
 
The entrepreneurs testifying before the Senate in 1939 contended that worker-capitalism improved 
not only a worker’s character, but also his productivity. “In our estimation,” a Hammerhill Paper Co. 
executive told the Senate Finance Committee, “based upon approximately 30 years’ experience, a 
profit-sharing plan or bonus system. . . helped to key up the organization, has provided an incentive 
for extra effort, and has been a means of stimulating and maintaining high standards of quality and 
the elimination of undue waste.”  “During the short time our plan has been effect,” testified the 
representative of Pacific Iron & Steel Company, “we have noticed a reduction in waste. Men are 
very much interested in keeping costs down, hence are more careful when using machines. . . 
[P]rofit-sharers work for the best interest of the company.”  
 
Extensive survey material from many nations confirms the common-sense contention that companies 
which use capital as part of employee compensation enjoy a higher level of popularity and 
confidence among their workers.  But hard data on worker productivity, compiled by Douglas L. 
Kruse of Rutgers, indicates that these attitudes translate into better workplace performance in 
companies offering asset-accumulation plans.  Surveying 500 companies, half with such plans, from 
1971 to 1991, Kruse concluded that the asset-sharers enjoyed worker productivity 3.5%-to-5.0% 
greater than companies lacking such arrangements. 
 
Matched Savings 
 
The “joint contribution of employees and employer” extolled by General Wood in 1939 can be 
understood as raises based on the bourgeois moral virtues of long-term thrift and deferred 
gratification.  In effect, an employer offers a higher total compensation package to employees who 
cultivate these virtues, against an option of a lower total compensation, but a higher take-home pay.  
An employee, by electing to participate in such a plan, defines himself as an individual with a long 
“event horizon” — someone who takes a long view of his occupation and his own life.  
 
The degree to which asset-accumulation indicates a heightened sense of personal responsibility has 
hardly been studied.  But what little we know indicates a positive correlation. In surveys, asset-
accumulators list their goals as:  retirement security, education, health care, home ownership, and 
business startups.  They spend more of their lives married than do their fellows who do not save.  
Moreover, in matched contribution plans, the act of saving — of deferring consumption for a long-
term goal — is itself an emblem of responsibility.  This is what endears Individual Development 
Account programs to many social conservatives, anxious to reclaim welfare not as they have known 
it, but as our forefathers did. 
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Conclusion 
 
Understand: Inequality no more motivates conservatives to redistribute assets than income.  The 
view from the Right evokes a vocabulary, a material analysis, and a moral perspective utterly alien 
to our colleagues on the Left.  We are more concerned to destroy communism than to transfer 
resources, more interested in reforming the poor than in subsidizing them. 
 
We are attracted by the concept of a nation of asset holders, because we believe that an electorate so 
constituted will be anti-socialist.  We are attracted by incentivized asset accumulation because we 
believe that such policies will incrementally voucherize, then privatize, the social functions 
government has usurped.  We support matched savings plans because we believe they improve the 
morals of their participants. 
 
Given these understandings, we are prepared to march arm-in-arm with our colleagues on the 
Left into the brave new world of worker capitalism.   
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Appendix 
Stated Democratic or Republican Party Affiliation: 
Owners of Portfolios of Stocks & Bonds => $5,000 vs Non-Owners of Portfolios 
  
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
 
E 
 
F 
 
G 
 
H 
 
I  
 
 
# of 
people 
in 
sample 
 
portfoli
o 
holders: 
% GOP 
 
portfolio 
holders: 
% DEM 
 
non- 
portfolio 
holders: 
% GOP 
 
 
non- 
portfolio 
holders: 
% DEM 
 
gap 
change: 
(C – D) 
minus 
(E – F) 
 
Total % 
GOP 
 
Total % 
DEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
% GOP 
 
% DEM 
 
% GOP 
 
% DEM 
 
 
 
%GOP 
 
%DEM  
all persons in sample 
 
6400 
 
37.94% 
 
32.91% 
 
27.07% 
 
40.58% 
 
18.54% 
 
31.60% 
 
36.94%  
all 18-29 yrs. 
 
1040 
 
33.24% 
 
33.43% 
 
22.52% 
 
37.49% 
 
14.78% 
 
 
 
  
all 30-39 
 
1059 
 
32.96% 
 
27.10% 
 
30.82% 
 
36.41% 
 
11.45% 
 
 
 
  
all 40-49 
 
1282 
 
36.58% 
 
33.52% 
 
26.17% 
 
43.69% 
 
20.58% 
 
 
 
  
all 50-64 
 
1658 
 
35.55% 
 
34.64% 
 
28.04% 
 
44.98% 
 
17.85% 
 
 
 
  
all 65+ 
 
1361 
 
43.89% 
 
36.80% 
 
32.49% 
 
47.44% 
 
22.04% 
 
 
 
  
all under $20k 
 
1249 
 
31.63% 
 
43.01% 
 
22.16% 
 
46.00% 
 
12.46% 
 
 
 
  
all $20k-40k 
 
2130 
 
38.67% 
 
35.55% 
 
29.12% 
 
41.67% 
 
15.67% 
 
 
 
  
all $40k-60k 
 
1360 
 
36.51% 
 
31.40% 
 
27.91% 
 
34.92% 
 
12.12% 
 
 
 
  
all $60k-75k 
 
538 
 
44.32% 
 
29.09% 
 
32.83% 
 
37.26% 
 
19.66% 
 
 
 
  
all $75k+ 
 
831 
 
37.58% 
 
31.40% 
 
35.10% 
 
26.73% 
 
-2.19% 
 
 
 
  
all males 
 
2525 
 
39.39% 
 
28.40% 
 
27.91% 
 
36.12% 
 
19.20% 
 
32.86% 
 
32.26%  
all males 18-29 yrs 
 
453 
 
33.83% 
 
28.67% 
 
25.91% 
 
33.56% 
 
12.81% 
 
 
 
  
all males 30-39 yrs 
 
456 
 
41.62% 
 
23.12% 
 
30.97% 
 
32.42% 
 
19.95% 
 
 
 
  
all males 40-49 yrs 
 
541 
 
37.61% 
 
29.55% 
 
25.53% 
 
39.63% 
 
22.16% 
 
 
 
  
all males 50-64 yrs 
 
625 
 
38.15% 
 
29.08% 
 
28.61% 
 
41.37% 
 
21.83% 
 
 
 
  
all males 65+ yrs 
 
450 
 
45.12% 
 
33.04% 
 
30.70% 
 
41.97% 
 
23.35% 
 
 
 
  
all males under $20k 
 
403 
 
27.90% 
 
32.91% 
 
20.15% 
 
44.56% 
 
19.40% 
 
 
 
  
all males $20k-40k 
 
812 
 
38.74% 
 
33.05% 
 
32.01% 
 
38.14% 
 
11.82% 
 
 
 
  
all males $40k-60k 
 
583 
 
41.96% 
 
26.74% 
 
27.57% 
 
26.55% 
 
14.20% 
 
 
 
  
all males $60k-75k 
 
250 
 
46.22% 
 
21.87% 
 
37.63% 
 
27.09% 
 
13.81% 
 
 
 
  
all males $75k+ 
 
370 
 
36.08% 
 
29.38% 
 
30.17% 
 
23.68% 
 
0.21% 
 
 
 
  
married men 
 
1577 
 
41.30% 
 
28.59% 
 
31.82% 
 
33.25% 
 
14.14% 
 
36.51% 
 
30.85%  
unmarried men 
 
948 
 
34.95% 
 
27.97% 
 
24.13% 
 
38.88% 
 
21.73% 
 
27.86% 
 
34.19%  
all females 
 
3875 
 
36.45% 
 
37.56% 
 
26.33% 
 
44.50% 
 
17.06% 
 
30.43% 
 
41.27%  
all females 18-29 yrs. 
 
587 
 
32.46% 
 
39.81% 
 
19.20% 
 
41.33% 
 
14.78% 
 
 
 
  
all females 30-39 
 
603 
 
36.75% 
 
31.33% 
 
30.66% 
 
40.45% 
 
15.21% 
 
 
 
  
all females 40-49 
 
741 
 
35.45% 
 
37.88% 
 
26.76% 
 
47.48% 
 
18.29% 
 
 
 
  
all females 50-64 
 
1033 
 
33.06% 
 
39.93% 
 
27.61% 
 
47.69% 
 
13.21% 
 
 
 
  
all females 65+ 
 
911 
 
42.86% 
 
39.93% 
 
33.51% 
 
50.55% 
 
19.97% 
 
 
 
  
all females under $20k 
 
846 
 
33.77% 
 
48.82% 
 
23.69% 
 
47.10% 
 
8.36% 
 
 
 
  
all females $20k-40k 
 
1318 
 
38.60% 
 
37.90% 
 
26.50% 
 
44.87% 
 
19.07% 
 
 
 
  
all females $40k-60k 
 
777 
 
30.84% 
 
36.24% 
 
28.26% 
 
43.33% 
 
9.67% 
 
 
 
  
all females $60k-75k 
 
288 
 
41.76% 
 
38.84% 
 
27.59% 
 
48.35% 
 
23.68% 
 
 
 
  
all females $75k+ 
 
459 
 
39.31% 
 
33.73% 
 
40.72% 
 
30.20% 
 
-4.94% 
 
 
 
  
married females 
 
2422 
 
39.01% 
 
35.10% 
 
29.70% 
 
41.57% 
 
15.78% 
 
33.95% 
 
38.43%          
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
15
 
A 
 
B 
 
C 
 
D 
 
E 
 
F 
 
G 
 
H 
 
I  
 
 
# of 
people 
in 
sample 
 
portfoli
o 
holders: 
% GOP 
 
portfolio 
holders: 
% DEM 
 
non- 
portfolio 
holders: 
% GOP 
 
 
non- 
portfolio 
holders: 
% DEM 
 
gap 
change: 
(C – D) 
minus 
(E – F) 
 
Total % 
GOP 
 
Total % 
DEM 
 
 
 
        
        
unmarried females 1453 30.24% 43.52% 22.30% 48.02% 12.44% 24.87% 45.74%  
All Whites 
 
5339 
 
40.59% 
 
31.40% 
 
33.31% 
 
34.42% 
 
10.30% 
 
36.73% 
 
32.96%  
All Blacks 
 
672 
 
20.63% 
 
58.06% 
 
5.81% 
 
74.34% 
 
31.10% 
 
10.15% 
 
68.74%  
Married 
 
3999 
 
40.17% 
 
31.82% 
 
30.64% 
 
37.89% 
 
15.60% 
 
35.14% 
 
34.90%  
Unmarried 
 
2401 
 
32.66% 
 
35.51% 
 
23.21% 
 
43.49% 
 
17.43% 
 
26.37% 
 
39.95%  
Govt employee 
 
672 
 
34.41% 
 
38.01% 
 
27.34% 
 
48.27% 
 
17.33% 
 
 
 
  
Private sector employee 
 
3087 
 
37.05% 
 
30.66% 
 
27.81% 
 
37.35% 
 
15.93% 
 
 
 
  
Retiree 
 
1735 
 
40.59% 
 
30.60% 
 
22.61% 
 
36.80% 
 
24.18% 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Data from Rasmussen Research; Calculations by Author) 
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